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ABSTRACT 
Shellfish farmers make their production decisions in an environment characterized by multiple 
uncertainty. As shellfish farming is done in an open area, producers face a large number of risks: 
e.g.  biological,  environmental,  pollution  or  climatic  risks.  Historically,  this  sector  has  been 
affected by several crisis; the last ones were the unexpected mortality of spat in 2008 and 2009. 
Insurance  is  one  important  potential  mechanism  for  managing  this  kind  of  risks  (e.g.  crop 
insurance in agriculture), but shellfish farming had limited insurance availability in France. The 
purpose of this article is first to determine specific risks of this segment of agriculture. We then 
present the existing hedging mechanisms, from self-protection / self-insurance measures to the 
possible intervention of the Fishery European Funds. We analyze the limits of such instruments 
and we try to explain why efficient protection is not available for this sector. Main reasons of 
such a lack are: High level of ambiguity in risks definition, individual correlation and the high 
degree of specialization of a small sector, what limits the possibility of risk pooling. Véronique 
Le Bihan & Sophie Pardo (co-authors,LEMNA-University of Nantes) 
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Introduction 
 
Shellfish  farming  is  an  important  activity  in  France  with  oysters  and  mussels  accounting 
respectively for 47% and around 30% of the whole production in 2008. Although the activity is 
highly  exposed,  very  few  insurance  policies  will  cover  risks  linked  to  the  production 
environment such as climatic events and epizootic diseases, to mention but a few. In the main, 
risk  coverage  takes  the  form  of  various  preventive  and  self-insurance  measures,  as  well  as 
solidarity schemes. 
 
Comparatively high mortality rates in the summers of 2008 and 2009, hurricane Xynthia striking 
the Atlantic Coast of France in 2010, numerous bans on commercialization have all recently 
undermined  the  industry,  with  the  result  that  shellfish  farmers  are  once  again  listing  risk 
management as their top concern, demanding new coverage instruments. IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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After outlining the specificity of risks in shellfish farming, we will set out the existing  risk 
coverage mechanisms in the industry, before analysing their limits and explaining why effective 
protection is not currently available. The last part will be devoted to concluding remarks. 
 
1) Specificity of risks in shellfish farming 
 
The first specificity of the shellfish farming industry relates to production risks. These are 
exacerbated because activities are carried on in an open environment:  
- Open environments induce yield variability, which has an impact on productivity. Except 
for oysters, where the production of spat oysters in hatcheries may limit a deficit in natural spat 
collecting, shellfish production is dependent on natural spat recruitment which itself depends on 
environmental factors (hydrobiology, climatology, currentology). 
- Shellfish growth is entirely reliant on trophic resources (shelfish farmers, unlike cattle 
and crop farmers, cannot take steps to make up for food deficits) 
Strong interactions within and between basins result in more intense exposure of livestock to 
health  hazards.  Sea  currents  may  thus  facilitate  transmission  of  epizootic  diseases.  Whereas 
agriculture can rely on a number of preventive or curative treatments for animals and plants, 
shellfish farmers are completely vulnerable to climatic, sanitary and other types of events. Health 
risks weigh heavily on the activity. 
 
Collecting  and  preserving  shellfish  in  unsinkable  basins  or  protected  areas  in  the  event  of 
disasters or as a preventive measure has become all but impossible today except for very small 
quantities and for a limited period of time. 
 
Another  specificity  of  shellfish  faming  relates  to  the  impact  of  farmers’  behaviours  among 
themselves and more particularly the existence of reciprocal negative externalities. Livestock 
farmed within a shared basin by a plurality of farmers tap a fluctuating trophic resource, the 
renewal of which depends on tides, environmental specificities and climatic changes. Intensive 
exploitation of beds may result in decreased productivity in the whole basin or contribute to the 
development of epizootic diseases. 
 
 
The second specificity of the shellfish farming industry relates to insitutional and financial 
risks.  Shellfish  (especially  oysters)  is  commercialized  and  consumed  as  a  live  product. 
Marketing therefore implies a great number of checks carried out before and after production so 
as to guarantee consumer product safety. As food safety norms are tightened and reliance on 
safety principles becomes commonplace, shellfish farmers have been faced with an increasingly 
restrictive regulatory context. 
 
The last specificity is the maritime public domain. Shellfish farmers also carry on an activity 
on the maritime public domain, which is administered by the State on behalf of the nation. This 
environment is therefore  inalienable.  Although  the  allocation  or  renewal  of  concessions  is  a 
relatively stable process, such authorizations are more and more easily revoked, owing among 
other things to increasing pressure from other forms of coastal exploitation (fishing, water sports, 
swimming, etc). Inalienability of the maritime public domain prevents mortgaging, which can 
raise difficulties when negotiating with lenders looking for guaranties. This is especially true of 
newcomers in the trade who cannot make a personal capital contribution. IIFET 2010 Montpellier Proceedings 
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2 ) Coverage mechanisms 
 
Risk is determined by the likelihood of events and the scale of consequences. Risk management 
in fish farming depends on measures allowing professionals either to reduce the likelihood of 
certain events (self-protection measures) or lessen the financial consequences of the said events 
(self-insurance, risk transfer and solidarity). 
 
Risk : likelihood of events and scale of consequences
Self-protection Self-Insurance risk Transfer   Solidarity principle
* Diversification :
- Species
- supply sources 
(spat)
- Complementary 
activity
- Distribution channel
- Geographic area 
* Good sanitary 
practice guidelines
* Preventive 
approach (HACCP)
* Temporary
cessation of 
shellfish activities
* Self-financing:
Financial reserves 
(Disaster Relief 
Scheme [DPA], 
equity capital, etc.)
Borrowing capacity
•Legal status of 
firm (company vs
family-run business)
• Detoxification
measures
* Outsourcing part 
of the production 
via contract signing
: Cf: forward 
contracts
* Insurance : 
customer default ; 
postponement of 
sales
* Natural Disasters
Compensation 
Scheme
* National 
Guarantee Fund for 
Agricultural
Disasters
* State Contribution: 
tax relief, tax 
exemptions, financial 
support for purchase of 
new livestock, low-
interest loan, etc.
* European Fisheries
Fund
* International Oil
Pollution Compen-
sation Funds (IOPC 
Funds)
* Minimis Aid
* National Guarantee 
Fund for Agricultural 
Disasters
 
 
 
Self-insurance will allow shellfish farmers to diversify their activities through: 
 
  -production of various species 
  -diversification  of  spat  supply  sources  in  order  to  equalize  quantities  produced  in 
hatcheries. Relying on ploidy differences has allowed oyster-farmers to change not only duration 
of production but also sales seasonality. 
  -Complementary production and trade activities (fishing, sustainable' blue' tourism...) 
  -Reliance on various distribution network to prevent loss of customers 
  -holding concessions in various production areas along the coast in order to lessen the 
risks of sanitary closures or climatic events, enjoy better natural productivity, etc 
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Preventive measures equally involve farmers, production tools (whether at sea and on land) and 
the  marketed  product.  Some  will  be  implemented  via  good  sanitary  practice  guidelines  or 
guidelines for application of HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point) principles  
 
Faced with regular proliferation of toxic phytoplanktonic algae, some farmers had rather put their 
activity on hold during risky periods than suffer the economic consequences of a ban on the 
commercialization of shellfish. 
 
 
Shellfish-farmers also rely on self-insurance by setting aside contingency funds and preserving 
their borrowing capacity in order to deal with possible damage. It is worth noting that the DPA 
(Déduction Pour Aléas or Disaster Relief Scheme) allows shellfish farmers to build up a nest-egg 
that may be used to face the damage resulting from climatic, sanitary, family or economic events. 
 
Shellfish-farmers who can use storage and purification basins can limit the effects of a sanitary 
closure. 
 
The  third  coverage  principle  concerns  risk  transfer.  The  recent  development  of  new 
commercial relations between various producers has allowed the parties involved to transfer part 
or the whole of the risks linked to the production environment (following the example of forward 
contracts). 
 
Although shellfish-farmers can take out standard personal or property damage insurance, only 
two  types  of  contracts  are tailored  to  meet  their  needs.  The  first one  covers  risks  linked  to 
commercialization,  ie  customer  default.  The  other  is  a  comprehensive  farm  insurance  that 
includes an optional supplementary insurance policy called ‘postponement of sales’. It insures 
farmers against cash losses following a ban on commercialization of toxic shellfish. Very few 
currently  take  out  such  insurance  owing  to  high  premiums  and  the  unavailability  of 
compensation except in the event of major disasters. 
 
The  Natural  Disasters  Compensation  Scheme  (régime  d’indemnisation  des  catastrophes 
naturelles) supplements the insurance system and provides compensation for uninsurable direct 
material  damage  resulting  from  a  climatic  event  (farmed  shellfish  is  excluded  from  the 
guarantee).  Halfway  between  mutual  aid  and  solidarity,  the  National  Guarantee  Fund  for 
Agricultural Disasters (Fonds national de garantie des calamités agricoles) is a scheme jointly 
funded by  farmers  and  the State.  It  covers part of the damage costs resulting from  climatic 
events. 
 
The last coverage principle in shellfish farming deals with solidarity.  Solidarity exists at 
various territorial levels (department, region, state) and may take the form of reduced social 
security contributions, exemption from property tax payable for leased state-owned property, 
partial relief on bank loan interests repayments, support for the purchase of new stocks and 
equipment, refundable advances, tax breaks, low-interest loans.  
 
At  European  level,  the  European  Fisheries  Fund  is  concerned  only  with  the  protection  of 
livestock or human health. Compensations are available only in the event of major disasters. 
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So-called de minimis aid is meant to support the activity of small and medium-sized businesses 
where no other measures exist at national or European level. It is distributed in the form of 
subsidies or aid with an upper limit fixed at €30,000 over a period of three years. 
 
At  an  international  level,  one  should  note  the  existence  of  the  International  Oil  Pollution 
Compensation (IOPC) Funds  
 
 
3) Limits of coverage mechanisms 
 
If  only  the  limits  of  insurance  schemes  and  solidarity  measures  is  considered,  today  risk 
coverage in shellfish-farming appears as insufficient or incomplete in the light of recent events 
such as the high mortality rates in the summers of 2008 and 2009. Unguaranteed damage is often 
overlooked when assessing the actual losses incurred by shellfish farmers: loss of livestock, 
workforce,  markets,  tarnished  reputations,  increased  investments,  running  costs,  developed 
security  procedures,  rising  insurance  premiums,  etc.  There  is  no  insurance  contract  to  meet 
farmers’ main needs, namely sanitary closures, livestock mortality, climatic events and pollution. 
The absence of insurance coverage raises the question of the uninsurability of such risks. 
 
Berliner (1982) has provided criteria for insurability. With the development of financial markets,  
These criteria are regularly modified while the limits of insurability have been pushed back. 
These  developments  remain  insufficient  for  insurers  to  offer  contracts  tailored  to  meet  the 
specific needs of shellfish farmers. Indeed, shellfish farming concentrates the main uninsurability 
factors, which may account for the small number of insurance contracts in the industry. 
 
Gollier (1996) suggests that a risk is insurable as soon as no mutually profitable risk transfer can 
be exploited by either the policyholder or the insurer. 
 
 
High transaction costs 
Unusual hazards in a narrow branch of industry may lead to high insurance costs. Insurers try to 
include these into a package of comparable yet independent hazards which allows them to spread 
the risks and take advantage of the law of large numbers. Assuming that all shellfish farmers 
took out a specific contract, mutuality would not necessarily allow insurers to offer an optimal 
contract. The merging of farming businesses in the recent years has made an increase in the 
number of subscribers unlikely. 
 
 
Strong correlation of individual risks 
Geographic  concentration  partially  undermines  the  independence  of  risks.  There  is  a  strong 
correlation of individual risks linked to the production environment. Systemic risk is important 
as illustrated by the mortality rate of juvenile oysters recorded in all French basins in 2008 and 
2009.  The  risk  of  systemic  mortality  may  lead  to  major  disasters  jeopardizing  the  financial 
equilibrium of insurers and makes it more difficult to mobilize reinsurers on these issues. 
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Ambiguity 
A third uninsurability factor is linked to the existence of an ambiguity resulting from the lack of 
objective probabilities to determine risks. Within the context of insurance, aversion to ambiguity 
will tend to increase the cost of contracts (Brunette & al., 2009 ; Camerer &  Weber, 1992 ; 
Hogarth & Kunreuther, 1985; 1989; 1992). Conversely, insurers’ loathing for ambiguity raises 
the cost of contracts (Kunreuther & al., 1995 ; Cabantous, 2007) and constitutes an uninsurability 
factor, particularly if only the insurer has an aversion to ambiguity or his aversion is stronger 
than  the  policyholder’s(Gollier,  1996).  In  shellfish  farming,  risks  linked  to  the  production 
environment are often characterised by strong ambiguity as natural events (whether climatic, 
sanitary  or  epidemiological)  are  numerous  and  poorly  known.  They  are  also  difficult  to 
determine. Indeed, the causes of shellfish mortality are often multifactorial and hard to pinpoint. 
Thus the oyster mortality rate in 2008 has been attributed to both environmental factors and 
infectious agents. 
 
 
Ex post moral hazard 
Ex post moral hazard in shellfish farming means that insurers are unable to check claims. The 
term refers not only to fraud risks but more generally the impossibility to verify losses. Farmers 
will not completely fulfil their obligation to declare commercial production, while the authorities 
will sometimes fail to implement  checks and sanctions. There is  a lack of data on shellfish 
volumes per age group. On-site assessment is both complex and costly and the lack of official 
area productivity tables as exist in agriculture makes it difficult to carry out a reliable inclusive 
evaluation. 
 
Solidarity and insurance schemes 
The State’s policy of unconditional financial relief in case of agricultural disaster today does not 
allow insurers to offer coverage in these areas. From a theoretical point of view, it is indeed 
assumed that the existence of public aids generates an  ex ante moral hazard by encouraging 
agents not to take the necessary preventive measures (Brunette & al., 2008, Latruffe & Picard, 
2005). The opposition between prevention and insurance on the one hand, and solidarity schemes 
on the other hand presupposes an evolution of solidarity funds that would allow the development 
of private insurance contracts. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The study of risks in shellfish farming shows that the industry is confronted with many risks that 
are  often  specific  to  the  environment  where  the  activity  is  carried  on.  Preventive  and  self-
insurance measures are limited by their complete dependence on environmental, sanitary and 
epidemiological uncertainties. Non-appropriation of land, ignorance of the potential impact of 
practices and customs on the level of damage make risk management difficult. The small number 
of insurance products is explained by the existence of uninsurability factors. Ambiguity and ex 
post moral hazards remain the most difficult obstacles to clear and require partnership work 
between shellfish farmers, scientists and insurers beforehand. A keen knowledge of the livestock 
and potential losses appears as a preliminary condition to any forecast. 
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